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Sullivan and Power: The "Parcel as a Whole" in Context

THE “PARCEL AS A WHOLE” IN CONTEXT: SHIFTING THE
BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF ECONOMIC LIFE – OR NOT
Edward J. Sullivan*
Karin Power**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps more than any other area of law, land use planning
manifests current societal values. From the application of skeptical
substantive due process analyses to regulation of land uses to modern-day urban growth boundaries, underlying notions of property
rights, fairness, and investment-backed expectations have long played
a significant role in the development of property law and land use
controls.1 This article will study but one aspect of this overall thesis,
judicial interpretations of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause to
achieve fairness in a certain regulatory context, the selection of the
precise parcel on which a takings analysis must focus when evaluating a takings claim. We contend that courts have implicitly relied
upon this overarching notion in evaluating the validity of government
regulation of a given parcel.
To ascertain whether a regulatory taking has occurred under
the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court normally utilizes a threefactor analysis articulated by Justice Brennan in the 1978 Penn Central decision.2 The proportion of the property affected by a regula*

B.A., St. John’s University (N.Y.), 1966; J.D., Willamette University, 1969; M.A. (History), Portland State University, 1973; Urban Studies Certificate, Portland State University,
1974; LL.M., University College, London, 1978; Diploma in Law, University College, Oxford, 1984; M.A. (Political Thought), University of Durham, 1998.
**
B.A., Mount Holyoke College, 2005; J.D., Lewis and Clark College, Northwestern School
of Law, 2011.
1
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 171-74 (Touchstone
2005, 3d ed.) (1973); Edward J. Sullivan, A Brief History of the Takings Clause, GARVEY
SCHUBERT BARER, http://www.gsblaw.com/news/publication/a_brief_history_of_the_takings
_clause/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2014) (identifying some of the tensions present in Takings
Clause jurisprudence).
2
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The deci-
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tion is often a decisive factor in affixing a value to the impact of the
regulation. However, as this article will examine, the most difficult
property regulations to evaluate have often been enacted as stopgap
mechanisms to secure threatened cultural or ecological resources that
may be present on that property,3 with courts later left to interpret the
validity of such regulations through fact-intensive inquiries. Thus,
Penn Central is sometimes regarded as an outlier decision lacking
precedent,4 but it nonetheless remains the recognized analysis applicable to testing the limits of environmental regulations, as well as in
determining the limits of constitutional land use regulations generally.
II.

PENN CENTRAL AND MAJORITARIAN VALUES

In 1966, twelve years before the Penn Central decision, Congress passed the National Historic Preservation Act,5 the first national
law to foster preservation of historically and culturally significant
properties.6 The roots of the preservation movement in New York
are often attributed to the demolition of Penn Station in October
1963.7 Penn Station, occupying eight acres over two city blocks, and
sion stated the factors as follows:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have particular significance.
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly,
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investmentbacked expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is
the character of the governmental action. A “taking” may more readily
be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a
physical invasion by government than when interference arises from
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life
to promote the common good.
Id.
3
Frank Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); see
Richard A. Epstein, An Outline of Takings, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 3 (1986) (criticizing the
utilitarian view of property); see also William A. Fischel, The Rest of Michelman 1967, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 372 (Kenneth Ayotte ed.,
2011) available at, http://www.dartmouth.edu/~wfischel/Papers/the_rest_of_michelman.pdf
(criticizing the utilitarian view of property).
4
Steven J. Eagle, The Parcel and Then Some: Unity of Ownership and the Parcel as a
Whole, 36 VT. L. REV. 549, 556-57 (2012).
5
16 U.S.C. § 470 (2006).
6
Id. For a timely assessment of the merits of New York preservation laws, see J. Peter
Byrne, Historic Preservation and its Cultured Despisers: Reflections on the Contemporary
Role of Preservation Law in Urban Development, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 665 (2012).
7
Eric. J. Plosky, The Fall and Rise of Pennsylvania Station, Changing Attitudes To-
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still considered today to be a magnificent example of the Beaux-Arts
architectural style, was in significant disrepair at the time.8 The
Pennsylvania Railroad Company optioned the air rights in the 1950s
over the soaring waiting room and glass-roofed train terminal in order
to dismantle and replace it with more profitable uses – present-day
Madison Square Garden and Penn Station.9 Public protests failed to
halt this construction.10
Two years later, New York City established the Landmarks
Preservation Commission (“Commission”) to oversee and regulate
redevelopment of architecturally and historically significant properties.11 Shortly after its formation, the Commission designated Grand
Central Terminal (“Terminal”) a landmark and conferred certain responsibilities and use limitations upon the owner.12 The Terminal’s
owner, Penn Central Transportation Co. (“Penn Central Co.”) also
faced maintenance and financial obstacles and sought to make use of
the air space above the Terminal.13 UGP Properties, Inc., an intended
office building lessee, submitted two alternative development plans
for a fifty-five and a fifty-three-story office building on top of the
Terminal, respectively.14 Both plans were rejected by the Commission as incompatible with the historic character and preservation of
the Terminal.15 Penn Central Co. did not appeal these decisions, but
it subsequently filed suit, asserting that the preservation law effected
a taking without compensation.16
The Court came to its finding of no taking through articulatward Historic Preservation in New York City (2000), http://www.subjectverb.com/www/wri
ting/thesis.pdf; but see RANDALL MASON, THE ONCE AND FUTURE NEW YORK: HISTORIC
PRESERVATION AND THE MODERN CITY (Univ. of Minnesota Press 2009) (discounting the
singular importance of the event as the sole foundation for the preservation movement, but
discussing its significance to the creation of the Landmarks Preservation Commission); see
also David W. Dunlap, 50 Years Ago, Sharply Dressed Protesters Stood Up for a Train Station They Revered, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2012, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/3
1/50-years-ago-sharply-dressed-protesters-stood-up-for-a-train-station-they-revered.
8
SAM ROBERTS, GRAND CENTRAL: HOW A TRAIN STATION TRANSFORMED AMERICA 165
(Grand Central Publishing 2013).
9
Id. at 165-66 (stating today, the ceiling height of Penn Station terminal is 125 feet
lower than that of the original main waiting room).
10
Id. at 166.
11
Id. at 168.
12
Id. at 169.
13
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 116.
14
Id. at 116-17.
15
Id. at 117.
16
Id. at 118.
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ing and applying the now-familiar three factors to its inquiry: (1) the
economic impact of the regulation, (2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the government action.17 In evaluating the merits of the Penn
Central Co. claim, two elements to this seminal analysis emerged that
have guided later takings cases: first, the nature of the ownership and
second, the remaining value and size of the parcel and viability of its
use.18 This second factor has contributed to Penn Central’s legacy
and provided the foundation for the relevant parcel doctrine, or “parcel as a whole” analysis:
“[t]aking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine
whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular
governmental action has effected a taking, this Court
focuses rather both on the character of the action and
on the nature and extent of the interference with rights
in the parcel as a whole . . . .19
As part of its portfolio, Penn Central Co. owned a number of other
nearby properties that were eligible to receive transferred development rights from the Terminal.20 One or two of these properties were
found expressly eligible for such office building improvements.21
Accordingly, the economic gain that could be made through building
higher floors on other sites could have eased the concern of the Court
in its evaluation of just compensation.22 However, in considering the
nature and extent of the limitations placed by the Commission (i.e.,
prohibiting exterior changes to the landmark without its permission)
on the totality of interests in the Penn Central parcel, the Court found
no taking as its analysis of property rights in the parcel under those
three factors apparently demonstrated that, even after the Landmark
designation, there was no justifiable need for compensation.23 However, the Court did note in dicta that the transferrable rights “undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has im17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Id. at 124.
Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992).
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130-31.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 122.
Id.
Id. at 138.
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posed.”24
Historic preservation was not the only concurrent form of protective regulations that gave rise to a taking claim in the late 1970s.
The year after the Court decided Penn Central, it heard a personal
property case challenging the application of the Eagle Protection and
Migratory Bird Treaty Acts as a taking.25 The Acts made it illegal to
engage in the sale or purchase of components of protected birds and
possession or transportation of bird parts. Though the Eagle Protection Act had been in place since 1940,26 by 1963, bald eagles were in
danger of extinction. In the lower forty-eight states, only 487 nesting
pairs remained.27 As a result, in 1962, Congress amended the Act to
encompass prohibitions on trafficking in feathers, eggshells, and other fractional parts.28
L. Douglas Allard and other traders in bird artifacts which
contained the restricted components were prosecuted for the sale of
such artifacts.29 They sued, alleging first that the artifacts in their
possession prior to the date of the statutes should be exempt from
regulation, and in the alternative, if the Act did apply to their arti-

24
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 137. In his seminal book, however, Richard Epstein questions whether the substitution of air rights from one building to another under common ownership can offset an economic burden under landmark preservation regulations, instead positing that reliance, even in part, upon such a transfer constitutes a different form of taking
(e.g., if air space is traded to another location, then it follows that the receiving location, too,
has limited use of its air space – a presumptive exaction on its own). RICHARD EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 189-90 (1985). In contrast, the authors in Compensation in TDR Programs: Grand Central Terminal and the
Search for the Holy Grail framed a comment by the New York Court of Appeals’ Judge
Breitel, questioning the reasonable return that real property owners might or should expect,
as the backdrop for their inquiry into what might enable an adequate TDR scheme, given
proximate property developments, societal investments and private interests, and other economic theory factors. See Jon M. Conrad & Dwight H. Merriam, Compensation in TDR
Programs: Grand Central Terminal and the Search for the Holy Grail, 56 U. DET. J. URB. L.
1 (1978).
25
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 52-56 (1979). The Bald Eagle Protection Act of
1940 is found at 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d, while the Migratory Bird Treaty Act is found at 16
U.S.C. § 703.
26
See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Eagle Permits Information page, UNITED STATES
FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE FWS.GOV, http://www.fws.gov/midwest/midwestbird/eagleper
mits/bagepa.html (giving a history of the Bald Eagle Protection Act) (last visited Mar. 30,
2014).
27
Id.
28
Joint Resolution to Provide Protection for the Golden Eagle, Pub. L. No. 87-884, 76
Stat. 1246 (1962).
29
Andrus, 444 U.S at 54.
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facts, then the regulations effected a taking.30 Justice Brennan, again
writing for the majority, noted that Congress had twice reviewed and
amended the applicable Eagle Protection Act without removing the
Department’s right to regulate previously owned artifacts.31 In contrast, Congress wrote the contemporaneous Endangered Species Act
to contain an exception for preexisting objects;32 but Congress had
made no similar exception with the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. 33 Justice Brennan concluded that while the Acts prohibited the most profitable use in the bundle of sticks, they did not appropriate ownership
in its entirety and found no taking, as the right to possess, transport,
or donate the artifacts remained.34 In 2007, due to such stringent protections and preservation efforts, the bald eagle was deemed recovered and delisted from the Federal List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants.35
III.

SENSITIVE LANDS AND DEVELOPMENT RESTRICTIONS

Perhaps no area of land use litigation has exemplified the
practical impact of real property regulations, benefits and burdens
than takings claims involving environmentally-driven laws restricting
development. Historically, the law had supported, if not outright encouraged, the conversion of sensitive ecological lands into productive
agricultural or business use.36 Since the 1600s, over half of the wetlands in the coterminous United States have been lost or otherwise
intentionally drained for development.37 As Penn Central Terminal
was to the origin of the historic preservation movement, a series of
30

Id. at 54-55.
Id. at 57.
32
Id. at 62.
33
Id.
34
Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66.
35
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Bald Eagle Delisting, UNITED STATES FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE FWS.GOV, http://www.fws.gov/pacific/ecoservices/BaldEagleDelisting.
htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
36
ROYAL C. GARDNER, LAWYERS, SWAMPS, AND MONEY: U.S. WETLAND LAW, POLICY,
AND POLITICS 5 (2011) (“[I]n the 1900 case of Leovy v. United States, [177 U.S. 621, 623
(1900),] . . . the Court upheld the right of Louisiana to construct dams that dried out the
swampy lands. Indeed, the Court observed that government not only had the power to conduct these reclamation efforts, but it was its duty to do so.”).
37
See, e.g., T.E. Dahl, Wetlands Losses in the United States 1780’s to 1980’s, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE (1990), available at
http://www.fws.gov/wetlands/Documents/Wetlands-Losses-in-the-United-States-1780s-to1980s.pdf. (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
31
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environmental disasters in the 1960s and 1970s similarly served as
the impetus for restrictions on development of sensitive lands.38 In
response to toxic waste, severe human health impacts, and a river on
fire,39 Congress passed a series of landmark protection laws intended
to halt further ecological degradation and restore the environment.40
As with landmark protection regulations, development restrictions on sensitive lands and Clean Water Act Section 404 removal-fill permit requirements were met with significant resistance, particularly from those whose ownership and development plans
predated controls.41 Concurrent with a rise in takings litigation over
wetland regulations came a greater awareness of the impacts that
modern industry had on ecological resources and the birth of the
modern environmental movement.42 Judicial examination of the hydrologic connection between newly-regulated sensitive lands and
navigable waters under the Clean Water Act43 and the Rivers and
Harbors Act44 mirrored the search for a predictable application of
Penn Central. Complex inquiries into whether the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers (“Corps”) possessed jurisdiction over various types of
wetlands were parsed out over contemporaneous cases, beginning
with a more expansive view of agency authority under United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes,45 later narrowed under Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers,46 and
38
See Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) Historical Topics (e.g., Rachel Carson, “Silent Spring”; Love Canal (1978); Valley of the Drums (1979); Earth Day (1970), all
available at http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/historical-topics.) (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
39
See Michael Rotman, Cuyahoga River Fire, Cleveland Historical Society, available
at http://clevelandhistorical.org/items/show/63#.Uwi9j_ldWP8 (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
40
See, e.g., the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321; the
Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251; the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.
§ 153; the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1451, and the Archaeological
Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. § 470aa.
41
See ROBERT MELTZ, DWIGHT MERRIAM, & RICHARD FRANK, THE TAKINGS ISSUE:
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 366 n.5
(1999) (noting that approximately 400 wetlands regulatory cases had been brought between
1960 and 1990, half of which raised Clean Water Act Section 404 permit takings claims and
other regulatory challenges).
42
GARDNER, supra note 36, at 7-8.
43
33 U.S.C. § 1251.
44
33 U.S.C. § 403.
45
474 U.S. 121, 134-35 (1985) (upholding the Corps’ authority under the Clean Water
Act to categorize “wetlands” in a reasonable manner and regulate fill activities on properties
adjacent to navigable waters where a type of vegetation is present that requires surface or
ground water saturated soils, and finding no taking).
46
531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (finding that seasonally-inundated isolated ponds do not
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further refined in a split decision in Rapanos v. United States,47 resulting in a site-specific hydrologic analysis of adjacent wetlands.48
The nuance inherent to wetlands takings determinations mirrors the lack of uniformity for a singular relevant parcel analysis.
Developing a bright line list of guidepost factors to illuminate considerations to ascertain a sufficient loss of property value to constitute
a taking is difficult given what are often fact intensive, ad hoc decisions.49 For a time, the outcomes of many cases that mounted a takings challenge reflected pro-environmental preservation concerns.50
However, later cases, such as Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
States51 and Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States.52 reinvigqualify as intrastate navigable water habitat for migratory birds, and thus are outside the
scope of the Corps’ jurisdiction).
47
547 U.S. 715, 739, 742 (2006) (deciding with a plurality of justices holding that
EPA and Corps jurisdiction may extend over “relatively permanent, standing or continuously
flowing bodies of water” connected to traditional navigable waters, and to “wetlands with a
continuous surface connection to” such relatively permanent waters). Similar to Penn Central, this decision prompted much consternation among environmental law practitioners, as it
has been largely left to lower courts to interpret Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test
factors. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Bolger, Post Rapanos: The Regulatory Miasma Engulfing Isolated Wetlands and the Clean Water Act, 10 No. 3 ABA AGRIC. MGMT. COMMITTEE NEWSL.
8 (August 2009).
48
Since the Rapanos decision, the EPA and the Corps have issued revised guidance
and clarification on Clean Water Act jurisdiction, generally stipulating that both Justice
Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test and Justice Scalia’s “continuous surface connection” test
will be utilized in fact-specific decisions regarding agency jurisdiction where isolated wetlands are adjacent to non-navigable tributaries, non-navigable tributaries are not relatively
permanent, or where wetlands are near but are not adjacent to non-navigable tributaries, given any hydrologic and ecological connections. See EPA and Corps’ joint June 2007 Memorandum, Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States (rev. Dec. 2, 2008), available at
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/2007_6_5_wetlands_RapanosGuid
ance6507.pdf, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/2008_12_3_wetlands
_CWA_Jurisdiction_Following_Rapanos120208.pdf. A draft rule was also sent by EPA and
the Corps to the White House Office of Management and Budget in September 2013, with
release of the draft rule for notice and comment contingent upon completion of a draft scientific study, available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/fedrgstr_activites/772435
7376745F48852579E60043E88C/$File/WOUS_ERD2_Sep2013.pdf.
49
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
50
See MELTZ, supra note 41, at 520-23 (outlining the interplay between environmental
concerns, takings law concerns, and conservation efforts in the Lake Tahoe and Nantucket
Island regions).
51
28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogated by Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. Untied States,
381 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
52
45 Fed. Cl. 21 (stating that the parties spent more than a decade in litigation); see
Florida Rock Indus. Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160 (1985), rev’d, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed.
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987), rev’d, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990), appeal filed, 18
F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1109 (1995), rev’d, 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999).
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orated the weight and consequence behind the relevant parcel determination and illustrated an evolving calculus behind takings valuations.
Loveladies Harbor explored the importance of the denominator analysis, but ultimately found in favor of the private property interest.53 In 1958, the plaintiff, Loveladies Harbor, Inc., acquired a
250-acre parcel, and in 1972, after the Clean Water Act took effect
that same year, sought to develop the remaining undeveloped 51
acres.54 After years of negotiations with the New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection, the parties settled and the state issued a
permit for fill of 11.5 of the 51 acres.55 In evaluating Loveladies
Harbor’s application for a federal Section 404 permit, the Corps was
informed by the state Department of Environmental Protection that
its own permit approval was not in conformance with state law requirements.56 The Corps subsequently rejected the permit application
in 1982.57 Loveladies Harbor challenged the permit denial in the
Court of Federal Claims, where the court found that the permit denial
effected a $2,645,500 loss in the fair market value of the parcel.58
The court made clear its view of the denominator problem in
takings claims: if it defined the relevant parcel broadly to include the
entire undeveloped fifty-one acres, then the economic deprivation of
the use of twelve acres is less proportionately significant.59 Conversely, if the inquiry is narrowed to just the affected property then a
near wipeout of economic value would result.60 Relying heavily upon Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,61 the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit gave greater weight to a newly articulated factor in order to determine the relevant property interest – the timing of
the environmental regulation’s application given the “interest vested
in the owner, as a matter of state property law, and not within the
53

Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1183.
Id. at 1174.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1174.
59
Id. at 1180.
60
Id.
61
Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003. Lucas found a per se or categorical taking if no viable economic use remained. Id. at 1031-32. The plaintiff in Loveladies Harbor made a similar assertion, but he focused on the smaller portion of his property, which had no use remaining,
while the defendant focused upon the entire parcel, which would require use of the default
Penn Central analysis. Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1180-81.
54
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power of the state to regulate under common law nuisance doctrine.”62 Predictably, Loveladies Harbor argued that the denominator
should apply to the narrower parcel and property interest under consideration, while the state argued for the broader and more inclusive
geographic approach.63 In upholding the Federal Claims Court’s decision finding a taking, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
ultimately determined that Loveladies Harbor’s land developed or
sold before the imposition of new wetlands regulations should not be
included as a part of the parcel under review.64
Florida Rock also examined the relevant parcel factors, and
the case illustrates how the same facts can be interpreted in the denominator analyses by different courts under divergent theories and
may lead to different results. Parcel owner Florida Rock Industries,
Inc. had purchased 1,560 acres of wetlands prior to the passage of the
Clean Water Act, intending to extract limestone beneath the property,
a process that necessitated the destruction of on-site wetlands.65
Though it initially began mining operations without a permit, when
notified by the Corps of its illegal activity Florida Rock ceased operations and began permit negotiations with the federal agency.66 The
Corps initially agreed to provide a permit for three years of mining on
approximately ninety-eight acres, but after reviewing Florida Rock’s
revised application, the Corps denied the permit on environmental
impact grounds.67 The Court of Federal Claims found that prior to
permit denial, the value of the land was $10,500 per acre, while postdenial, the property’s value was negligible, and accordingly awarded
Florida Rock $1,029,000 plus interest and attorneys’ fees.68
The case was subsequently appealed, remanded, and appealed
69
again. During the first appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit found that the parcel inquiry had contemplated only the inter-

62
Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1179. See also Courtney Tedrowe, Conceptual Severance
and Takings in the Federal Circuit, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 586, 614-16 (2000) (discussing
fairness and strategic conceptual severance by both owners and the government as applied in
this case, a narrower analysis that the court avoided by adopting a larger denominator in its
parcel determination).
63
Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1180-81.
64
Id. at 1181.
65
Florida Rock, 45 Fed. Cl. at 25.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 26.
69
Id. at 25.
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est in the limestone, whereas the correct value assessment should
have been made in appraising the whole of the interests in the property.70 On remand, the parties submitted competing assessments of the
value of the property and comparable sales.71 Again, the Federal
Claims Court found a taking.72 Nevertheless, on the second and final
appeal to the Federal Circuit, the court, after reviewing evidence on
the record of unsolicited offers to buy the property as well as other
wetland sales at the time of the permit denial, looked to the “market
as a whole” in support for its decision.73 Given that the value of the
property was not eliminated entirely through the permit denial but
was merely reduced by an estimated $6,000 per acre, the court held
that no taking had occurred.74
On remand from the Federal Circuit, the Court of Federal
Claims posited the case outcome and analysis of the parcel as a whole
conundrum as follows:
The notion that the government can take two
thirds of your property and not compensate you but
must compensate you if it takes 100% has a ring of irrationality, if not unfairness, about it. If the law said
that those injured by tortious conduct could only have
their estates compensated if they were killed, but not
themselves if they could still breathe, no matter how
seriously injured, we would certainly think it odd, if
not barbaric. Yet in takings trials, we have the government trying to prove that the patient has a few
breaths left, while the plaintiffs seek to prove, often at
great expense, that the patient is dead.75
70

Florida Rock Indus. Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d at 1563.
Id. at 1564.
72
Id. at 1562.
73
Id. at 1565.
74
Id. at 1572.
75
Florida Rock, 45 Fed. Cl. at 23-24; see also supra note 52 (outlining the procedural
history of the Florida Rock case). The decision also echoed a significant factor that often
plays a background role in case outcomes over wetlands development restriction challenges,
as it did in Loveladies – the timing of the federal and state law with particular regard to
whether such regulations were in place prior to purchase of the property. See also David F.
Coursen, The Takings Jurisprudence of the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit,
29 ENVTL. L. 821, 842 (1999). With Florida Rock, the owners had purchased the property
only months before the Clean Water Act was enacted. Florida Rock, 45 Fed. Cl. at 25. The
economic burden of the regulation seemed to tip the scales in the owners’ favor, with the
partial taking that the court attributed to the regulation in its “market as a whole” analysis
71
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Acknowledging that not all economic use of the property had been
taken under the Penn Central analysis but that nonetheless a partial
regulatory taking had occurred within the ninety-eight-acre parcel,
the court awarded Florida Rock $752,444 plus interest from the date
of the taking and encouraged the parties to engage in settlement
agreements in lieu of additional appeals.76
IV.

ADDITIONAL RELEVANT PARCEL OBSERVATIONS

While some have detailed various objective tests in relevant
parcel inquiry cases,77 the cases do not reflect such a facile analysis;
however, several commonalities are frequent components of the cases.78 This section reflects these commonalities.
A.

Penn Central Remains the Rule

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency79 serves as the case that most commonly stands for
the temporal application of the parcel as a whole inquiry and reinforced the lasting significance of Penn Central.80 The facts of the
case were driven by an urgent need for protection and restoration of
Lake Tahoe and implemented through land use moratoria.81 Development adjacent to the lake significantly affected water quality and
had the effect of adding sediment and nutrient loads, so that in 1980,
the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency imposed two successive mora-

reflecting the balancing test undertaken by the court. See Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for
Denominators: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Property in the Regulatory Takings Relevant
Parcel Analysis, 34 ENVTL. L. 175, 201 (2004). See also Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657
F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981), in which completion of a developer’s phased development project
was frustrated due to increased scope of regulation; nonetheless, the court did not find a taking.
76
Florida Rock, 45 Fed. Cl. at 23.
77
See, e.g., John E. Fee, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Takings Claims,
61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535 (1994) (articulating an independent economically viable development test referenced in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001)); STEVEN J.
EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 7-7(e)(5) (4th ed. 2009) (suggesting a “commercial unit”
test generally in real estate transactions in the area).
78
Eagle, supra note 4, at 556-57.
79
535 U.S. 302 (2002).
80
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606; see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528
(2005).
81
John D. Echeverria, A Turning of the Tide: The Tahoe-Sierra Regulatory Takings
Decision, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11235 (2002).
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toria on development, cumulating in a total ban lasting thirty-two
months, to allow time to draft and implement a regional plan and implementing rules.82 Landowners sued, claiming a temporary taking.83
At the district court level, the plaintiffs’ claims of a partial taking
were rejected under Penn Central but validated under their total, albeit temporary, deprivation of economic use theory under Lucas.84
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed a trial court conclusion that a
temporary taking had occurred, determining that Lucas applies only
where all productive use is permanently denied.85 Writing for the
majority, Justice Stevens rejected the notion that one could sever
dozens of months of regulation from the overall fee simple estate to
serve as the basis of a taking; both temporal and physical aspects of
property must be seen as part of the parcel as a whole.86 Temporary
restrictions that will terminate at a future, ascertained point pass with
time and largely leave the parcel in its entirety unaffected. Accordingly, unless categorical takings are implicated through physical invasion or deprivation of total economic use,87 the Penn Central factors govern.88
B.

Common Ownership Provides Impetus for a
Presumption of Contiguous Whole

In a recent case, Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States,89 a
development company was denied use of a mosquito impoundment
site by the Corps; however, the Federal Circuit, on appeal from the
Court of Federal Claims, found no unified scheme or other evidence
of intended inclusion of that site within a greater development plan
82

Id. Temporary moratoria were enacted after Tahoe Regional Preservation Authority
(“TRPA”) was unable to meet Congressional deadlines to set environmental threshold carrying capacities for Lake Tahoe. See also Angela Schmitz, Taking Shape: Temporary Takings
and the Lucas Per Se Rule in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Authority, 82 OR. L. REV. 189, 198-200 (2003).
83
Echeverria, supra note 81.
84
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 316.
85
Id. at 319.
86
Id. at 331.
87
See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (holding that no viable economic use for the land
and no administrative process for relief is a required element); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1992) (defining physical invasion of property).
88
For further discussion of these points, see Steven Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. (2014) (forthcoming), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2359566, at 37-41.
89
707 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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and treated that parcel alone as the relevant parcel for a takings analysis.90 Lost Tree had purchased 2,750 acres on a barrier island, other
islands, and a peninsula, and proceeded with development on a
piecemeal basis.91 Its first 404 permit for a large portion of its holdings was approved after modifications; the lot at issue at the time was
an impoundment site and was not included in development plans or
plat recordings.92 After the company learned through a neighboring
development that such lots could potentially be used to generate mitigation credits, it submitted a permit application in order to utilize the
site for that purpose, though no such use was made of the site, which
was then overlooked by its owner for a number of years.93
In reviewing the nature of the development to ascertain the
appropriate parcel denominator, the Federal Circuit both rejected the
aggregate of plaintiff’s holdings, as well as the lot alone as the relevant parcel.94 The Court of Federal Claims had combined the lot at
issue with another contiguous plat and other scattered undeveloped
wetlands.95 With that combination, the value of the relevant parcel
then diminished by 58.4%, so that no taking was found.96 In this and
other analogous cases, the absence of economic expectations and the
distinct temporal treatment of the parcel led Federal Circuit courts to
believe that development of the lot had simply been ignored by the
developer in the master plans.97 Here, Lost Tree had left some lots
undeveloped purposefully, advertising them as open spaces, not as
part of a unified development scheme or development plan.98 That
unintentional separate treatment by the developers of this leftover
parcel appeared to be a significant factor in the outcome of this case
in which the Court of Federal Claims’ aggregation of the lot at issue
with other surrounding lots was rejected, the lot at issue was viewed
90

Id. at 1288.
Id.
92
Id. at 1289.
93
Id. at 1290-91.
94
Lost Tree, 707 F. 3d at 1291.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 1290. The court’s view of the undeveloped parcel at issue, originally omitted,
then proposed as a wildlife open space preserve in one permit application, might be viewed
as the “reciprocity of advantage” discussed in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. McMahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922), as open spaces, setbacks, and other regulatory requirements contribute to wellplanned communities. Similarly, the externalities sustained by the Lost Tree plaintiffs are
part of such burdens of land use regulations. See MELTZ, supra note 41, at 580-83.
98
Lost Tree, 707 F.3d at 1293.
91
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as the relevant parcel and a taking was found.99
Daniels v. Area Plan Commission of Allen County100 reflects
the inverse situation, where common ownership afforded a beneficial
presumption of a contiguous whole. Plaintiffs bought property in a
subdivision that was platted for eighty lots and restricted to residential use via a restrictive covenant.101 The owners of three lots along a
major north-south corridor requested rezoning in order to redevelop
the properties for commercial uses.102 Against the plaintiffs’ objections, the Allen County Planning Commission approved the rezoning
request and vacated the restrictive covenant.103 The plaintiffs filed a
takings claim and were granted a preliminary injunction at the district
court level that voided the removal of the restrictive covenant.104
While ripeness was the primary issue, as the plaintiffs did not avail
themselves of state court relief, the court reviewed the restrictive
covenant and takings claim through an extensive analysis of the subdivision as a whole.105 The voiding of the covenant was ultimately
found to be a taking that conferred no public benefit, despite no demonstrable loss in property value of owners’ neighboring land.
C.

Facial Takings Claims Often Fail, Absent Specific
Valuation of Denied Use

In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,106
petitioners, an association of coal operators and corporations, challenged two sections of a Pennsylvania Subsidence Act (“Subsidence
Act”).107 Section 4 of the Subsidence Act, as implemented by administrative rules of the Pennsylvania Dept. of Environmental Resources
(“DER”), required approximately fifty percent of coal beneath three
categories of structures to remain in place for certain uses: public
99

Id. at 1294.
306 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2002).
101
Id. at 449.
102
Id. at 449-50.
103
Id. at 450.
104
Id. at 451.
105
Daniels, 306 F.3d at 459-61. The court also found that the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim
was ripe, as the available state remedies (monetary damages and injunctive relief) would not
provide adequate relief and, therefore, met the exception to the state remedies exhaustion
requirement set forth in Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172 (1985). Id. at 457-58.
106
480 U.S. 470 (1987).
107
Id. at 474.
100
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buildings and noncommercial buildings used by public; residential
dwellings; and cemeteries.108 Section 6 of the Subsidence Act allowed DER to revoke a mining permit if coal extraction would cause
damage to one of the three protected categories of uses and structures
(and the permit holder had not repaired damage, deposited an equal
sum, or satisfied claims within six months of subsidence).109 At the
District Court level, the court found for the DER and respondents,
holding that although severely restricting a mineral right on some
portions of a parcel involves one of the more important sticks in the
bundle of rights, that action alone is not facially indicative of a taking.110 The Court of Appeals, however, did not view the support estate as a singular property interest, but as part of the greater whole –
inclusive of both the surface and mineral estate in the land’s entirety.111
The Court, finding for the state, distinguished Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon,112 on two grounds: first, unlike the Kohler Act
that altogether prohibited mining causing subsidence under structures, here, health and safety were at stake; and second, the Kohler
Act effectively enacted a blanket prohibition against mining in certain areas and was viewed by the Court as largely protective of private interests.113 Here, the purpose of the Subsidence Act was to protect the public welfare.114 Notably, the question presented was not an
as-applied challenge but whether the enactment of the Subsidence
Act itself was a facial taking.115 As petitioners only brought a facial
108
Id. at 476. Conversely, the coal companies had an estimated 1.46 million tons of
coal available in mines – with the restricted portion constituting less than 2% of the total resource. See MELTZ, supra note 41, at 410.
109
Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 477.
110
Id. at 479. For a lengthier discussion of the history behind subsurface mining restrictions, see MELTZ, supra note 41, at 411-16.
111
Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 480.
112
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
113
Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 484. The nature of investment-backed expectations in the vertical severance context, particularly as in Pennsylvania Coal and Keystone
Bituminous, where the mining companies may have once owned both the surface and subsurface rights, raises interesting implications for the Takings Clause. See WRIGHT, supra note
75, at 201 (discussing whether the Takings Clause is designed or intended to insure all landowners against risky investments or only protect against catastrophic losses).
114
Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 474.
115
Id. at 493, 495. In contrast, the company in Pennsylvania Coal had shown that the
statute precluded its ability to engage in its business. See Susan M. Stedfast, Regulatory
Takings: A Historical Overview and Legal Analysis for Natural Resource Management, 29
ENVTL. L. 881, 901 (1999).
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challenge, some of their arguments were based on statistics and estimated costs and thus made discerning the relevant parcel more complex.116 Justice Stevens noted in his decision that irrespective of the
Subsidence Act, some of the underground coal would have had to
remain in place given extraction constraints.117 Petitioners also
acknowledged in interrogatories that only two percent of coal would
need to be left in place under the Subsidence Act and were unable to
demonstrate the isolated effect of the regulation alone.118 Relying
upon prior parcel as a whole jurisprudence, the Court rejected an attempt to isolate and frame the coal into the sole property interest affected – either as a specific volume of coal or as a separate support
estate.119 Citing Penn Central, the Court explained that while “verbal
formulizations” do not provide a prescriptive blueprint for determining the baseline condition of the property being taken, they do often
provide sufficient sideboards (e.g., through the character and nature
of action and interference) to review the merits of claims.120 The surface regulation character of the action here was common under zoning regulations and, as noted in the Court of Appeals’ decision, the
support estate exists to serve either the minerals or surface estate and
cannot be feasibly segmented from the parcel.121
D.

The Influence of Prior Knowledge in the Parcel as
a Whole Analysis

In those cases where developers and owners are aware prior to
their purchase of existing property restrictions affording limited economic use or the likelihood that development permits will be denied
and the owner decides to proceed nonetheless, courts have been significantly less inclined to find a taking. In Ciampitti v. United
States,122 the real estate developer plaintiff bought beachfront lots in
New Jersey in the early 1980s bordering, in part, on an area designated as wetlands. The properties were below grade and did not have
116

Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 495.
Id. at 498.
118
Id. at 496, 498.
119
Id. at 497-98; see also Stedfast, supra note 115, at 913 (discussing the application
of Penn Central’s ‘reciprocity of advantage’ and the public benefit that accrues from the
prevention of harm to the community through such regulations).
120
Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 497.
121
Id. at 498, 501.
122
22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991).
117
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streets or utilities.123 Over the subsequent years, the developer and
various business partners invested in dozens more lots, some owned
by a family predecessor venture group.124 In 1983, the plaintiff purchased forty-five lots; fourteen were designated wetlands and eighteen were subject to some form of regulation.125 As the neighboring
area had, in part, been developed at the time of purchase, and since
the properties contained a deed grant that allowed removal-fill, the
developer believed that he would nonetheless be permitted to develop
the area notwithstanding federal limitations.126 Negotiated settlements between the state and developer allowed for upland development, but after the applicable wetland permit application was denied,
the developer filed suit alleging a taking.127 In finding that no taking
had occurred, the court, in its relevant parcel analysis, was perhaps
most influenced by the actual and constructive notice of the applicable wetland regulations prior to purchase, thereby reducing any legitimate investment-backed expectations.128
Walcek v. United States.129 provides an analogous case, where
actions by the developer undoubtedly tainted the evaluation of its takings claim. Prior to the Clean Water Act, the plaintiff purchased 14.5
acres in two transactions, failing to conduct due diligence on suitability for development prior to purchase.130 Though the town had zoned
the property for residential use, approximately four-to-five acres were
regulated as wetlands by the State of Delaware.131 During an attempted sale, the plaintiffs discovered the applicable regulations, and
then knowingly began to fill the property without a permit, terminating that activity only after the issuance of a cease and desist order.132
After a takings complaint was filed, the Corps authorized some development in a 1996 permit conditioned on wetland remediation

123

Id. at 312.
Id. at 312-13.
125
Id. at 313.
126
Id. at 315.
127
Ciampitti, 22 Cl. Ct. at 316-17.
128
Id. at 315; see Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1053 (2000) (finding no taking when the landowner similarly continued to proceed with property development irrespective of increasing regulation); see also
Coursen, supra note 75, at 840.
129
303 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
130
Id. at 1351.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 1352.
124
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elsewhere.133 Accordingly, the Federal Claims Court determined that
it was not a categorical taking.134 On appeal, the Court of Appeals
concurred that the proper acreage was what had been submitted to the
court originally: that out of the 14.5 whole acres, the 13.2 federal
wetland acres had been impacted by regulation, and since the 1996
permit allowed 2.2 acres to be developed, all economically viable use
had not been deprived.135 The plaintiff’s permit denial was thus not a
categorical taking, as the court’s relevant analysis found that the remaining portion of the property that could be developed provided an
economically viable use.136
E.

Interruptions in Ownership and Takings Claims

In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,137 petitioner Anthony Palazzolo
had invested in three undeveloped salt-water marshland waterfront
properties with business partners in 1959.138 He later bought out his
associates but ownership of the parcels remained under the corporate
name.139 Petitioner submitted various applications for residential lot
development; all were ultimately denied by state agencies.140 In 1971
and 1983, Rhode Island enacted further regulations protecting salt
marshes as coastal wetlands.141 In 1978, the corporation’s charter
was administratively revoked, and petitioner inherited the property as
the sole shareholder.142 He subsequently filed an inverse condemnation action after the final denial of a beach club proposal in 1985,
seeking $3.15 million in damages derived from his appraisal of the
property’s highest and best use, i.e., for residential subdivision lots.143
The lower courts ruled in favor of the state, finding that an upland
parcel of the property still had value, Palazzolo’s claim was not yet
ripe, and, furthermore, he had no right to challenge pre-1978 regula-

133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Id. at 1353.
Walcek, 303 F.3d at 1353-54.
Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1355-56.
533 U.S. 606 (2001).
Id. at 613.
Id.
Id. at 614.
Id.
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 614.
Id. at 615-16.
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tions because of the interruption in the chain of title.144
The relevant parcel issue before the Court involved a change
in the chain of title of the properties from Palazzolo’s joint ownership
with his associates to his later acquisition of the subject properties as
a sole owner, which commenced after the regulations were enacted.145 The state argued that the passage of title from the corporation
to Palazzolo as an individual should serve to restart the clock on the
permissibility of takings challenges.146 The Court was not persuaded,
instead holding that the effect of such a rule would be draconian.147
Such a practice could effectively insulate a state against takings
claims by later landowners, regardless of how egregious the restriction might be and would equally bar successors or inheritors to
property from later bringing claims.148 Equally, the Court observed
that notice of prior statutes does not obviate a state’s “duty to compensate for what is taken.”149
As the Court found the petitioner’s claims were not unripe,
the case was remanded to the state Supreme Court for further examination of the economic impact of the denial of the permits. 150 Justice
O’Connor concurred in a separate opinion, also cautioning that the
discussion of the relationship between timing of ownership and regulation is not to be given undue weight, as the “polestar instead remains the principles set forth in Penn Central itself and our other
cases that govern partial regulatory takings.”151 Nevertheless, as Justice O’Connor noted in her concurrence, a landowner’s notice of a
regulation was not irrelevant: “[I]t would be just as much error to expunge this consideration from the takings inquiry as it would be to
accord it exclusive significance.”152
An earlier, if unusual, takings case further illustrates the tension between proffered benefits and burdens of land use controls. In
144

Id. at 616.
Id. at 626.
146
Id. at 626-28; see F. Patrick Hubbard et al., Do Owners Have a Fair Chance of
Prevailing Under the Ad Hoc Regulatory Takings Test of Penn Central Transportation
Company?, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 121, 131-32 (2003) (noting that the effect of
Palazzolo served to reinforce Penn Central as the rule, even when substantial losses in property value are sustained, absent a Lucas categorical taking).
147
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627-28.
148
Id. at 627.
149
Id. at 628.
150
Id. at 632.
151
Id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
152
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633.
145
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Hodel v. Irving,153 the plaintiffs were Oglala Sioux heirs that brought
a takings challenge to the Indian Land Consolidation Act.154 The intent behind the statute was to keep tribal land under tribal ownership,
as allotment of lands often ended up in non-tribal hands.155 The Act
attempted to preserve ownership through a prohibition on property
transfers to multiple interests.156 The Act provided that where the interest represented two percent or less of the total acreage, it escheated
to the tribe.157 Deprived of ownership through this process, the plaintiffs brought an as-applied takings claim.158 The Court of Appeals
overturned the district court’s holding that the Act was constitutional,
finding that the plaintiffs had a right to control disposition of their
own property.159 The Supreme Court concurred that the right to leave
property to relatives and others in death was one of the most valuable
sticks in the bundle of sticks and that the seizure of tribal property
upon an owner’s death and transfer of title to the tribe exceeded any
reasonable policy goals of the statute.160 Here, the parcel was not only the immediate, but also the future, interest in ownership.161
V.

CONCLUSION

As a philosophical construct, it is impractical to believe that
an objective relevant parcel takings test can be construed from such
highly fact-specific cases often driven by changing regulatory priorities. On balance, relevant parcel inquiries may also provide a more
fair and comprehensive, albeit somewhat subjective approach to the
application of the Penn Central factors.162 However, on behalf of
those who bear the primary burden of such regulations, there is much
value to be sought in refining and clarifying multifactor analyses of

153

481 U.S. 704 (1987).
Id. at 709-10.
155
Id. at 712.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 709.
158
Hodel, 481 U.S. at 710.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 716.
161
Id. at 717.
162
See Dwight Merriam, Rules for the Relevant Parcel, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 353
(2003); see also Daniel R. Mandelker, Speech: New Property Rights under the Taking
Clause, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 19 (1997) (echoing this reticence to set formulaic tests in his
critique of segmentation analysis’s contribution to takings theory).
154
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the relevant parcel.163 There are some factors that may be gleaned
from the cases thus far, however:
1. Penn Central remains the default analysis for any regulatory takings analysis that is not in a presumptive per se category.164
2. Contiguous parcels in the same ownership will be presumed to be the relevant parcel for takings purposes.
3. Facial claims involving multiple parcels in the same ownership will not likely result in a successful regulatory takings claim.
Specific facts must be analyzed.
4. Concepts as indefinite as “property rights,” fairness, and
investment-backed expectations are significant latent factors in determining whether a parcel may be carved out from other ownerships
and treated separately.
5. Similarly, courts are not supportive of unlawful conduct,
such as the knowing failure to secure required permits, in evaluating
a relevant parcel.
6. Conversely, a court may be impressed by the treatment of
a parcel as separate from other lands under the same ownership over
time.
In short, the recognition of the allocation of burdens and benefits of economic life by a court in dealing with the contention that a
parcel should be treated separately is not governed by a simple binary
equation. Rather, the cases demonstrate that the judicial task is to
weigh and balance an open-ended number of factors to achieve an
optimum constellation of property rights, fairness, and investmentbacked expectations. While the struggle to achieve that balance is
difficult, in the absence of the Supreme Court’s cutting the Gordian

163
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that “[t]here is an
inherent tendency towards circularity . . . for if the owner’s reasonable expectations are
shaped by what courts allow as a proper exercise of governmental authority, property tends
to become what courts say it is.”); see also Eagle, supra note 4, at 552.
164
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; see also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432, 440 (demonstrating
alternative analytical frameworks to the Penn Central approach).
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knot, that task remains the expectation of the courts for the foreseeable future.
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